

The Age of Deception: Nuclear Diplomacy in Treacherous Times

From Metropolitan Books

The Age of Deception: Nuclear Diplomacy in Treacherous Times From Metropolitan Books

For the first time, Mohamed ElBaradei, Nobel Prize laureate and "man in the middle" of the planet's most explosive confrontations, speaks out---on his dealings with America, negotiations with Iran, reform and democracy in the Middle East, and the prospects for a future free of nuclear weapons.

The Age of Deception: Nuclear Diplomacy in Treacherous Times

From Metropolitan Books

The Age of Deception: Nuclear Diplomacy in Treacherous Times From Metropolitan Books

For the first time, Mohamed ElBaradei, Nobel Prize laureate and "man in the middle" of the planet's most explosive confrontations, speaks out---on his dealings with America, negotiations with Iran, reform and democracy in the Middle East, and the prospects for a future free of nuclear weapons.

The Age of Deception: Nuclear Diplomacy in Treacherous Times From Metropolitan Books Bibliography

- Sales Rank: #1926880 in Books
- Dimensions: 9.42" h x 1.23" w x 6.50" l, 1.28 pounds
- Binding: Hardcover
- 352 pages

Editorial Review

Review

ElBaradei has interesting stories to tell, and he tells them with verve... Anyone wishing to glimpse some of the central tensions in 21st-century international diplomacy should read *The Age of Deception*.
Washington Post

ElBaradei passionately advocates making diplomacy the main recourse in counterproliferation and he s right to do so.... *The Age of Deception* provides the grist for serious debate even as it helpfully chronicles the International Atomic Energy Agency s journey from a relatively obscure group of technicians to an organization with growing international clout.
The New York Times Book Review

In this spirited memoir ElBaradei recounts ferreting out the nuclear secrets of the world s most paranoid regimes, nerve-wracking adventures full of intrigue, car chases, and Pyongyang s grim hotel accommodations. ElBaradei s accounts of diplomacy are fascinating and rife with acerbic portraits of George W. Bush, Tony Blair, and other world leaders... The result is a lively, acerbic take on recent geo-political confrontations that makes an impassioned case for using persuasion rather than punishment to resolve the direst threats.
Publishers Weekly

--Various

[Audio Review] Nobel Peace Prize laureate (2005) ElBaradei announced on March 9, 2011, his candidacy for president of Egypt; the election is scheduled for this fall. In this timely memoir, ElBaradei concentrates on the necessity of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, especially into the hands of rogue states and terrorists, to ensure global survival. During his 12-year tenure (1997 2009) as head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), ElBaradei was a key participant in dramatic, headline-dominating confrontations over nuclear proliferation, most famously during the IAEA inspections in Iraq, which found no violations and no nuclear weapons. ElBaradei s principal themes are the need to strengthen the mandate and standing of the IAEA; to curb sword-waving by the world s great powers; and to emphasize diplomacy and collective security over nuclear proliferation. There is plenty of grist in this firsthand account, which will likely be the subject of lively, serious debate within world governments. Narrator and actor David Drummond s impressive, steady reading enlivens the material; for foreign policy wonks everywhere. --Library Journal

About the Author

Mohamed ElBaradei served as Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency from 1997 to 2009. He was awarded the 2005 Nobel Peace Prize, together with the IAEA, and has also been honored with the Indira Gandhi Prize for Peace, Disarmament and Development; the Nile Collar; and the Roosevelt Institute's Four Freedoms Award. Founder of the Egyptian opposition movement The National Association for Change, ElBaradei lives in Cairo.

Introduction

"Help us help you."

The man on the other side of the table smiled, but it was not happiness that I read in his expression. His eyes softened, and the corners of his mouth drooped. Was it sadness? Fatigue? I wasn't sure.

It was February 9, 2003. It had been more than a dozen years since the UN Security Council had first issued sanctions on Iraq. In a little more than a month there would be yet another U.S.-led invasion. Saddam Hussein had recently readmitted UN weapons inspectors to Iraq, and Hans Blix and I, the leaders of the international teams, were making our third visit to Baghdad. This was our last evening. The Iraqi foreign minister, Naji Sabri, had invited us to dinner, along with our principal experts and an assortment of Iraqi counterparts.

The restaurant was the finest the city could still offer. Baghdad's infrastructure was worn at the seams, showing the effects of the sanctions. But the dinner service was elegant, the waitstaff gracious, the dark red linen tablecloths spotless. There was plenty of grilled fish, fresh from the Tigris River. The skewers of lamb kebab were spiced to perfection. And the table bore another treat: wine. That was a surprise. Alcohol was forbidden in public in Iraq, under an edict passed in 1994. But for this evening, for their out-of-town guests, the Iraqis had made an exception.

The man across the table was General Amir Hamudi Hasan al-Sa'adi, chief scientific adviser to Saddam Hussein. The title of "general" was essentially honorific. An urbane, charismatic negotiator with a PhD in physical chemistry, al-Sa'adi was equally eloquent in English and Arabic and preferred tailored suits to military uniforms. Although not a member of the Ba'ath Party, he served as the scientific front man for the Iraqi government.

Blix and I had steered the dinner conversation toward a critical theme: the need for more cooperation, more documentation. You insist you have no weapons of mass destruction, we said. You tell us you have not revived any of your prior WMD programs. But we cannot simply close the file where your records are incomplete. We need more evidence. The more transparency you show, the more documentation and physical proof you can produce, the better it will be for Iraq on the world stage. What else can you provide to resolve the gaps in your information? *Help us help you.*

Sitting beside al-Sa'adi was Husam Amin, the head of Iraq's UN interface group. He leaned forward to answer. "Let us be frank," he said. "First, we cannot give you anything more because there is nothing more to give." His glance shifted to Blix, then back to me. "But, second, you cannot help us, because this war is going to happen, and nothing you or we can do will stop it. We both know that. Whatever we do, it is a done deal."

He sat back. Al-Sa'adi nodded but said nothing. The sadness remained in his smile.

Despite Amin's view, I refused to believe that war was inevitable. The International Atomic Energy Agency, the UN agency responsible for the nuclear weapon inspections, which I headed, had been making solid progress. This included following up on every intelligence lead we were given—and finding nothing. In my report to the UN Security Council on January 27, I had stated, "We have to date found no evidence that Iraq has revived its nuclear weapons programme." This statement had garnered strong criticism from Western officials and media pundits who had convinced themselves otherwise—but these critics were pointing to circumstantial what-ifs and characterizing them as proof. What I had said was the truth.

The IAEA was not yet in a position to issue Iraq a clean bill of health. But I had urged the council to allow the inspections to run their course. A few more months, I had proposed, would constitute "a valuable investment in peace." If the justification for a preemptive invasion of Iraq rested on Saddam Hussein's reconstituted WMD programs, then where was the evidence? Where was the imminent threat? If Amin was telling the truth, and Iraq had "nothing more to give," then the implications were significant: there was no threat.

A war without justification was certain to drive a divisive wedge into the already fractured relationship between the nuclear "haves" and "have-nots." Both the United States and the United Kingdom had nuclear weapons and showed no signs of giving them up; yet they were threatening Iraq for allegedly seeking to acquire such weapons. For many in the developing world, and particularly in Arab and Muslim societies, this was both ironic and grossly unfair. Saddam Hussein enjoyed relative popularity among the Arab public for his stance against Israel's treatment of the Palestinians and his defiant attitude toward the West. He was not a favorite among the mostly pro-Western Arab rulers, particularly after his 1990 invasion of Kuwait; but still it rankled to watch Iraq being treated with such disregard for its sovereignty. If a war were actually to occur, and particularly one hinging on trumped-up WMD charges, the sense of outrage across the Arab and Muslim world would escalate sharply.

Still, as the weeks wore on, with all my faith in the inspection process, I had a growing sense of unease. The rhetoric emanating from the United States and the United Kingdom was increasingly strident. Just four days before the dinner in Baghdad, U.S. secretary of state Colin Powell had made his case to the Security Council: he had played audio tapes of intercepted telephone conversations and had shown satellite photos of Iraqi facilities. These records, he declared, demonstrated "disturbing patterns of behavior" on the part of Saddam Hussein and his regime, "a policy of evasion and deception." To the inspection community, his presentation was primarily an accumulation of conjecture, an alignment of unverified data interpreted according to a worst-case scenario. Nowhere was there a smoking gun. But to many listeners, and particularly to nonspecialists, Powell's argument was compelling.

During the six weeks that followed, no amount of inspection progress or diplomatic intervention would prove sufficient to avert the impending crisis. The IAEA revealed that key intelligence documents, purportedly linking Saddam Hussein to attempts to purchase uranium from Niger, had been forged. But the discovery made little impact. An emergency summit of Arab leaders in Sharm el-Sheikh, instead of developing a solution or even a unified position, ended in disarray. A last-ditch proposal by the British to avoid military action fell flat.

Early on the morning of March 17, I received the call from the U.S. mission in Vienna advising us to move our inspectors out of Baghdad. The invasion was about to begin.

"If a danger exists in the world, it is a danger shared by all; and equally . . . if hope exists in the mind of one nation, that hope should be shared by all." These were the words of U.S. president Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1953, in the "Atoms for Peace" speech that, four years later, gave birth to the International Atomic Energy Agency. It was an extraordinary message, delivered in the midst of an expanding nuclear arms race, to an international community that had not forgotten the devastation of the Second World War.

Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace concept—the notion that both the benefits and insecurities of nuclear science must be addressed cooperatively by the international community—is the core principle of nuclear diplomacy. It would become a near-universal commitment to foster technological cooperation in peaceful uses of atomic energy and to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons—a dual commitment enshrined in the IAEA Statute and the landmark 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

As a young Egyptian lawyer and professor of international law in New York in the early 1980s, I felt a resonance with the Atoms for Peace ideal. I joined the IAEA in 1984 and became its legal adviser three years later. By the time of the 2003 Iraq War, I had been the IAEA Director General for more than five years and part of the Agency for almost two decades. I had immersed myself in the Agency's nuclear diplomacy mission. For a war to be fought over unsubstantiated WMD charges—and for the IAEA's nuclear diplomacy role to be pushed to the side, serving as merely a fig leaf of due process—was for me a grotesque distortion of everything we stood for. It went against nearly half a century of painstaking labor by committed scientists, lawyers, inspectors, and public servants from every continent. I was aghast at what I was witnessing. The thought that would not leave my head was the certainty that nothing Blix or I had seen could possibly justify going to war.

General Amir al-Sa'adi, my melancholy dinner partner, turned himself in to coalition forces on April 12, 2003, after he learned that he was number thirty-two on the list of the most-wanted Iraqis and the seven of diamonds in the infamous deck of playing cards. He asked the German television station ZDF to film his surrender. Speaking into the camera, he announced, "We have no weapons of mass destruction, and time will bear me out." It was clear to me then that our provisional conclusion regarding nuclear weapons was correct, because by that time al-Sa'adi had no reason to lie.

In the years since, multiple sources have confirmed that the premise for the March 2003 invasion—the charge by the United States and the United Kingdom that Saddam Hussein's WMD programs represented an imminent threat—was groundless. The U.S.-appointed Iraq Survey Group would later spend billions of dollars to verify that the international inspectors were correct: Iraq had not revived its WMD programs. Nor, apparently, was the alleged WMD threat the real motivation for the U.S. and U.K. aggression. The famously leaked "Downing Street" memo from July 2002 was one of several sources indicating that the decision to go to war had been taken well before the inspections ever began.

To this day, I cannot read such accounts without refl...

Users Review

From reader reviews:

Archie Williams:

Book is usually written, printed, or created for everything. You can understand everything you want by a guide. Book has a different type. We all know that that book is important issue to bring us around the world. Close to that you can your reading expertise was fluently. A e-book The Age of Deception: Nuclear Diplomacy in Treacherous Times will make you to possibly be smarter. You can feel much more confidence if you can know about every thing. But some of you think that open or reading a book make you bored. It is not make you fun. Why they can be thought like that? Have you seeking best book or acceptable book with you?

Keri Yokum:

Do you among people who can't read gratifying if the sentence chained within the straightway, hold on guys this kind of aren't like that. This The Age of Deception: Nuclear Diplomacy in Treacherous Times book is readable simply by you who hate the straight word style. You will find the info here are arrange for enjoyable studying experience without leaving also decrease the knowledge that want to provide to you. The writer associated with The Age of Deception: Nuclear Diplomacy in Treacherous Times content conveys the

idea easily to understand by most people. The printed and e-book are not different in the content but it just different by means of it. So , do you nonetheless thinking The Age of Deception: Nuclear Diplomacy in Treacherous Times is not loveable to be your top checklist reading book?

Arthur Lee:

Do you have something that you want such as book? The book lovers usually prefer to pick book like comic, limited story and the biggest the first is novel. Now, why not attempting The Age of Deception: Nuclear Diplomacy in Treacherous Times that give your satisfaction preference will be satisfied by reading this book. Reading practice all over the world can be said as the way for people to know world a great deal better then how they react toward the world. It can't be said constantly that reading routine only for the geeky particular person but for all of you who wants to always be success person. So , for every you who want to start reading through as your good habit, it is possible to pick The Age of Deception: Nuclear Diplomacy in Treacherous Times become your current starter.

Aaron Marks:

Is it a person who having spare time then spend it whole day by simply watching television programs or just lying down on the bed? Do you need something new? This The Age of Deception: Nuclear Diplomacy in Treacherous Times can be the response, oh how comes? It's a book you know. You are and so out of date, spending your time by reading in this completely new era is common not a geek activity. So what these guides have than the others?

Read The Age of Deception: Nuclear Diplomacy in Treacherous Times From Metropolitan Books for online ebook

The Age of Deception: Nuclear Diplomacy in Treacherous Times From Metropolitan Books Free PDF d0wnl0ad, audio books, books to read, good books to read, cheap books, good books, online books, books online, book reviews epub, read books online, books to read online, online library, greatbooks to read, PDF best books to read, top books to read The Age of Deception: Nuclear Diplomacy in Treacherous Times From Metropolitan Books books to read online.

Online The Age of Deception: Nuclear Diplomacy in Treacherous Times From Metropolitan Books ebook PDF download

The Age of Deception: Nuclear Diplomacy in Treacherous Times From Metropolitan Books Doc

The Age of Deception: Nuclear Diplomacy in Treacherous Times From Metropolitan Books Mobipocket

The Age of Deception: Nuclear Diplomacy in Treacherous Times From Metropolitan Books EPub

RE8J12XAG76: The Age of Deception: Nuclear Diplomacy in Treacherous Times From Metropolitan Books